The maximal generic number of Nash equilibria for two person games in which the two agents each have four pure strategies is shown to be 15. In contrast to Keiding (1995) , who arrives at this result by referring to the enumeration of Gr unbaum and Sreedharan (1967), our argument is based on a collection of lemmas that constrain the set of equilibria. Several of these pertain to any common number d of pure strategies for the two agents.
Introduction
Consider the two person game in which each agent has d pure strategies and the payo s are (1; 1) on the diagonal (with respect to some orderings of the agents' pure strategies) and (0; 0) elsewhere. For any nonempty set of pure strategies for agent 1 there is an equilibrium in which agent 1 assigns equal probability to all elements of this set and agent 2 mixes equally on her corresponding pure strategies. All such equilibria are regular (Harsanyi, 1973) implying that nearby games (in the space of pairs of utility functions) have at least as many equilibria, namely 2 d ? 1. Quint and Shubik (1997) initiated the study of the conjecture that there is no pair of utilities for which there are more than 2 d ? 1 regular equilibria, showing that this is the case when d = 3. The problem has been studied by Keiding (1995) , who used the enumeration of polytopes in IR 4 with 8 faces (Gr unbaum and Sreedharan, 1967) , together with Lemma 4.4 below, to show that the conjecture holds in the case d = 4. Recently von Stengel (1997) constructed an ingenious sequence of examples (one for each d) which are counterexamples for d = 6 and d 8. These examples are based on the dual of the cyclic polytope in IR d with 2d faces, which the celebrated Upper Bound Theorem shows to be the polytope, among all polytopes in IR d with 2d faces, that has the most vertices. It is tempting to conjecture that, for d su ciently large, von Stengel's examples attain the upper bound on the number of Nash equilibria, but insofar as this new conjecture is not obviously more natural, or supported by much more evidence, than the one these examples refute, it is also natural to be cautious.
In this paper we present a variety of results bearing on the problem, some of which are general, while others are speci c to the case d = 4. Collectively these results allow a di erent proof of Keiding's result for the case d = 4, which is not a matter of searching through a lengthy enumeration. With respect to the impression these results give of the problem for general d, on the one hand there seems to be an abundance of particular ideas that pose limits on the set of equilibria, but on the other hand the nal stage of our analysis considers a number of cases, suggesting that something else is needed to tame the combinatoric complexity of the problem when d 5.
The remainder of this section describes related literature.
Fixing strategy spaces for a normal form game with possibly more than two players, McKelvey and McLennan (1997) characterize the maximal (as the payo s are varied) number of regular totally mixed equilibria. In the same setting, McLennan (1997) shows that the maximal number of pure equilibria, for generic payo s, is the number of pure strategy vectors (that is, the product of the cardinalities of the agents' pure strategy sets) divided by the maximal number of pure strategies possessed by any agent. A lower bound on the maximal number of regular equilibria, of all sorts, is obtained by combining this with the theorem of Gul, et al.(1993) , who use index theory to show that, for generic payo s, the number of mixed equilibria cannot be less than one fewer than the number of pure equilibria.
Extending earlier results of Dresher (1970) and Powers (1990) , Stanford (1995) obtains a formula for the probability that a \randomly selected" payo vector will have exactly m pure strategy equilibria. (The assumed distribution on payo vectors has all agents' payo s statistically independent, with each agent assigning equal probability to all possible orderings of the pure strategies.) Stanford (1994) extends this analysis to symmetric two person games, di erentiating between symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.
Problem Formulation
Let S and T be nonempty nite disjoint sets of pure strategies for agents 1 and 2, respectively, with the same number of elements. Let d = jSj = jTj. (Throughout we denote the cardinality of a set X by jXj.) We identify the elements of S with the standard unit basis vectors in IR S . Let H S be the a ne hull of these points, i.e., the a ne hyperplane consisting of the points in IR S whose coordinates sum to one; elements of H S are called generalized mixed strategies. For any A S let (A) be the convex hull of A, let (A) be its interior (relative to the a ne hull of A) and for 2 (S) let supp be the support of , i.e., the subset A S such that 2 (A).
The payo s for agent 2 are given by a ne functions u t : H S ! IR for the various t 2 T. Here u t ( ) is the expected payo agent 2 receives when she plays t and agent 1 follows the generalized mixed strategy . Let P = f ( ; u) 2 (S) IR : u u t ( ) for all t 2 T g: Then P is a polyhedron that is, geometrically, a sawed o prism that extends \to heaven."
A possibility for P in the case S = fA; B; Cg and T = fa; b; cg is shown in Figure 1 .
The facets of P are: (a) F s , for s 2 S, where F s is the vertical facet of P, called a heavenly facet, along which the probability of s is zero; (b) G t = f ( ; u) A Nash equilibrium is a pair ( ; ) 2 (S) (T) with L( ; max t2T u t ( )) L( ; max s2S u s ( )) = S T:
That is, each pure strategy is either unused or optimal (or both).
We are interested in generic utilities. Here the important consequence of genericity is that, for any proper subset A S and any subset B T, the dimension of ( Let : H n L !Ĥ be de ned by requiring (x) to be the unique scalar multiple of x that is contained inĤ. LetP = (P). TransformQ n fwg similarly to arrive atQ. The details (which are numerous) of the veri cation thatP andQ satisfy the description of the problem used here, up to a ne transformation, are left to the reader. For a detailed discussion of the properties of the projective transformations used in this construction we recommend Ziegler (1995, x2.6 ).
In passing from Keiding's framework to ours, a particular complementary pair is singled out arbitrarily, with the facets intersecting at the vertices in this pair becoming the heavenly facets of our formulation. This seems arti cial, in that it creates an asymmetry that does not exist in the original formulation, but we have found that this asymmetry induces a rich and useful structure.
The level of a virtual vertex of P is the number of its labels that are members of S, i.e., the number of pure strategies assigned zero probability. Let V i be the set of vertices of P in level i. Then V d?1 is the set of vertices that project to elements of S; these vertices are said to be pure since they correspond to pure strategies. Also, V 0 = T t2T ? t is a singleton whose unique element is called the geocenter of P and is denoted by g P . In response to this point all pure strategies yield the same expected utility for agent 2. The geocenter of P is a vertex of P if and only if (g P ) 2 (S).
The notation for the other agent is symmetric: the level of a virtual vertex of Q is the number of its labels that are contained in T, W i is the set of vertices of Q in level i, and the geocenter g Q is the unique element of W 0 = T s2S ? s . Indeed, our results will be usually stated as applying to P, but should be understood as applying equally to Q.
For the most part our argument proceeds by identifying various subsets of V which necessarily contain a certain number of elements that are not complementary. The partition of vertices into levels provides useful information in this process. For instance, a pair of complementary vertices are in the same level. Also, since a vertex is complementary to at most one vertex, the number of complementary vertices of level i is at most minfjV i j; jW i jg.
The Decomposition of the Simplex by Best Responses
We now describe a di erent geometric presentation, in H S IR d?1 , of the information constituting the problem. For the case of d = 4 this presentation can be visualized, and is the most intuitive formulation for many purposes.
For each t 2 T let C t be the set of 2 H S that have t as a best response. Clearly C t is a convex cone emanating from (g P ). We have S t2T C t = H S , essentially because T is nite. The sets C t determine the best response correspondence, and thus all the other information relevant to the problem.
For t 2 T consider the line l t = ( T t 0 6 =t ? t 0 ) H S consisting of those generalized mixed strategies such that all pure strategies for agent 2 other than t have the same expected utility. This line is divided into two rays by (g P ). Let r t = f 2 l t : u t 0 ( ) u t ( ) for t 0 6 = t g be the closed ray consisting of the points for which all elements of T nftg are best responses. (Here con is the convex hull operator.) For any hyperplane in H S containing (g P ), each of the two open halfspaces bounded by the hyperplane contains at least one open ray r t n f (g P )g. Proof: Clearly con( S t 0 6 =t r t 0 ) C t . At a point 0 2 r t 0 agent 2's best responses include all pure strategies except t 0 , so t is the unique best response to any strict convex combination of points from the various sets r t 0 n f (g P )g. The set of such convex combinations is the interior of con( S t 0 6 =t r t 0 ). The line segment between such a convex combination and any point 2 H S ncon( S t 0 6 =t r t 0 ) intersects the boundary of con( S t 0 6 =t r t 0 ) at a point which has at least one best response, say t , that is di erent from t. At every point in the interior of con( S t 0 6 =t r t 0 ) the value of u t is greater than the value of u t , and the two functions must be equal at the point on the boundary, so u t ( ) > u t ( ) since u t and u t are a ne. Thus there are no points outside of con( S t 0 6 =t r t 0 ) that have t as a best response, i.e., C t con( S t 0 6 =t r t 0 ). That T t 0 6 =t C t 0 = r t follows immediately from the de nitions. If H H S is a closed halfspace with (g P ) on its boundary that contains all of the rays r t , then H also contains all the cones C t , from which we could infer that points outside H had no best responses, which is absurd. The equivalence of the perspective presented here with the one described in the last section can now be expressed by the equation
10 Remark: The relative simplicity of the structure presented by Lemma 3.1 explains why it is di cult to generalize our analysis to games in which the two players have di erent numbers of strategies. Concretely, suppose we add one more pure strategy to T. Now di erent utilities for agent 2 can give rise to combinatorially inequivalent partitions of H S according to best response, as the reader can demonstrate easily through experimentation, and (in our methods) each combinatorial possibility must be analyzed separately.
Results for All Dimensions
With the hope of building a useful tookit, we have tried to nd versions of our methods that are applicable to all d. The cases in which this e ort has succeeded are described in this section.
Cliques
Our genericity assumption implies that P and Q are simple: each vertex is a member of exactly d facets. Since each vertex v of P has exactly d labels, say`1; : : : ;`d, the intersection of the planes associated with any d ? 1 of these labels, say`2; : : : ;`d, is a 1-dimensional a ne subspace of H S IR that intersects P in a line segment, called an edge, that has v as one endpoint. The other endpoint is described as the neighbor of v reached along the edge obtained by dropping`1. In general two vertices of P are adjacent or neighbors if they are the two endpoints of an edge. 
. Since the two sets have the same number of elements, they must be equal, and in fact
Any other member of the virtual clique must also share these labels since that is the only If all elements of a virtual clique are, in fact, vertices, then the collection is said to be a clique. Now all the virtual vertices of a linear virtual clique are contained in the a ne line de ned by the d ? 1 common labels, and if there are any vertices among them, they must be the two endpoints of the line segment that is the intersection of this line with P (or Q). Proof: Each pure vertex has d ? 1 labels in S and a single label in T, so to be a clique v 1 ; : : : ; v k must have a common label in T, say t. The unique pure vertex of Q that has all labels in T except t is complementary to at most one of v 1 ; : : : ; v k .
Keiding's method in showing that there are at most 15 equilibria is to apply these results on cliques to a list, due to Gr unbaum and Sreedharan (1967) , of all simple polytopes in IR 4 that have at most eight facets but have more that 16 vertices. The results in the remainder of this section, and in the next section, give conditions under which certain vertices are not complementary. Except as noted, these results do not seem to be consequences of the clique principle. We have not succeeded in constructing an argument using only the result on cliques, even though Keiding's analysis indicates that such an argument should exist.
Almost Completely Mixed Strategies
Consider a vertex v with a single label s in S, so that v 2 V 1 . If the geocenter is a vertex, it is adjacent to v, and must be the vertex reached along the edge obtained by Lemma 4.6: If g P is a vertex, then P s2S s = d: If g P is not a vertex, then a heavenly facet F s is said to be an exiting facet if the geocenter and P are in the same halfspace of the two halfspaces de ned by s . (The idea is that a ray starting at the geocenter might exit P through such an F s .) Otherwise F s is said to be an entering facet. Let S in and S out be the sets of s 2 S such that F s is entering or exiting, respectively. When the geocenter is not a vertex, each ray beginning at the geocenter and passing through a vertex in V 1 must intersect P in a line segment with the endpoint closest to the geocenter in an entering facet and the other endpoint in an exiting facet. Equivalently, proceeding from (g P ) along a ray r t that passes through (S), we rst pass through (S ? fsg) for some s such that F s is an entering facet, then exit through (S ? fs 0 g) for some s 0 such that F s 0 is an exiting facet. Thus we describe (S ? fsg) as an entering facet of (S) if (g P ) and (S) are on opposite sides of the hyperplane of H S that contains (S ? fsg), and otherwise (S ? fsg) is an exiting facet. Lemma 4.7: If g P is not a vertex, then P s2S in s = P s2S out s d ? 1: Thus there are at most 2d ? 2 elements of V 1 . Proof: Each ray r t that intersects (S) de nes exactly two vertices of level 1, one in an entering facet and one in an exiting facet, so the vertices of level 1 are divided equally between the two types of facets. Since g P is not a vertex, (g P ) is not in (S), hence can be separated from it by a hyperplane, and the halfspace de ned by this halfspace that does not contain (S) must contain one of the rays r t , by Lemma 3.1. So, at most d ? 1 of these rays intersect (S).
Lemma 4.8: For each s, s d ? 1. Proof: Separate (S n fsg) from (g P ) with a hyperplane and proceed as above.
14 We now note a particular application of the clique principle. we may assume that s 2 for all s. We may also assume that~ = (2; 2; : : : ; 2; 1; 1), since the other possibility,~ = (2; 2; : : : ; 2; 2; 0), is inconsistent with Lemma 4.7 because d ? 1 is odd. Thus, for each s there is a vertex v 2 V 1 \ F s , and this vertex is complementary to a vertex, say w, whose labels include S n fsg. Therefore (w) is in the intersection of the ray r s with (T), and in particular this intersection is nonempty. It follows that all d rays r s must intersect (T), which is impossible: (g Q ) is not in (T) and can be separated from it by a hyperplane, after which Lemma 3.1 implies that some r s does not intersect (T).
Mixtures Over All But Two Pure Strategies
Now consider a vertex v 2 V 2 . It has two labels in S, say s and s 0 , so there are two edges leading out of it obtained by dropping these labels. Each of the two edges terminates either at an element of V 1 or at an element of V 2 , and according to which case pertains we say that the edge is anchored or oating respectively. 
Floating Walls
Much of the analysis speci c to d = 4 will be focused on the four facets of (S). These facets are two dimensional, so in this context a oating edge divides the containing facet into two parts. The generalization of this idea to higher dimensions involves the potentially dividing object having codimension one. For distinct t; t 0 2 T and ; 6 = A S, the set D A \ G t \ G t 0 is called a wall.
Note that ? t \ ? t 0 is an a ne plane of codimension 2 in H S IR. Since ? t and ? t 0 are graphs of a ne functions from H S to IR, there cannot be two points in ? t \ ? t 0 that di er only in their nal component, so (? t \ ? t 0 ) is an a ne plane of codimension one in H S . Our genericity assumption implies that, for any nonempty A S, (? t Proof: (a) Observe that each element of V 1 \ E s is on the boundary of d ? 1 of the sets G t \E s , and each group of d?1 sets of the form G t \E s has at most one point in common. In particular, if V 1 \ E s has two or more elements, then every wall contains at least one of them, so no wall is oating.
(b) Suppose v 2 V 1 \ E s , and let t be the unique element of T such that v = 2 G t . Any oating wall in E s must be of the form 0 = E s \ G t \ G t 0 and if 00 = E s \ G t \ G t 00 is another oating wall, then 0 and 00 divide E s into three pieces. Since G t \ E s has both walls on its boundary, G t 0 \ E s and G t 00 \ E s must be disjoint, a contradiction of the assumption that they both contain v.
(c) Any collection of k oating walls divides E s into k + 1 regions. Each such region contains the interior of at least one of the sets G t \ E s , and the interior of such a set is connected and cannot be part of more than one region. Thus the number of oating walls is not greater than the number of elements of T less one.
Separation
The point made in this subsection is a consequence of the convexity of each facet G t .
For s 2 S (t 2 T) let v s = (s; max t u t (s)) (w t = (t; max s u s (t))) denote the corresponding pure vertex of P (Q). For any particular pair of pure strategies s; s 0 2 S, D fs;s 0 g will consist of a sequence of touching edges proceeding from v s 0 to v s . Each of these edges projects to a line segment in (fs; s 0 g) on whose interior there is a unique best response.
In this way the ordering of the edges, as one proceeds along D fs;s 0 g from v s 0 to v s , induces a nite sequence t 1 ; : : : ; t K called the best response chain going from s 0 to s. Each t 2 T appears at most once in a best response chain because each G t is convex.
Lemma 4.15: For any s; s 0 ; s 00 2 S, the elements of T that appear in the best response chain going from s 0 to s, and also in the best response chain going from s 00 to s, have the same order in the two chains.
Proof: Suppose that t and t 0 appear in both chains. We may assume that t is not the last element of either chain, since then it would be the best response to s, hence the last element of both chains. We may also assume that t is not the rst term in at least one of the two chains, say the one going from s 0 to s. We can now see that (D fs;s 0 ;s 00 g \ G t ) is a convex polygon in (fs; s 0 ; s 00 g) that includes portions of both (fs; s 0 g) and (fs; s 00 g), but does not include either s or s 0 . Therefore D fs;s 0 ;s 00 g nG t has at least two connected components. For any t 0 2 T, the relative interior of D fs;s 0 ;s 00 g \ G t 0 is convex (in particular, connected), hence is contained in one of these components. The desired result follows easily. In particular, the edge between w 1 and w 2 is a oating wall D ft 1 ;t 2 ;t 3 g \ G s 0 \ G s that divides D ft 1 ;t 2 ;t 3 g into two components: the component that contains the relative interior of D ft 1 ;t 2 ;t 3 g \G s 0 also contains w t 2 , and the other contains the relative interior of D ft 1 ;t 2 ;t 3 g \ G s and fw t 1 ; w t 3 g. Hence, moving along D ft 2 ;t 3 g from w t 3 , the best response is s on the edge immediately before w 2 and is s 0 on the edge immediately after w 2 .
Oddness
Lemma 4.18: The number of Nash equilibria is odd. Proof: Cf. Shapley (1974) .
The Four Dimensional Case
In this section we present two lemmas that seem to be particular to the case d = 4. Now V is partitioned into the sets V 0 = fg P g, V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 , where V 3 is the set of pure vertices. The elements of V 1 and V 2 will now be called low and high vertices, respectively.
As we noted earlier, for this dimension a oating edge in F s is a oating wall in E s and vice versa, so s = s ; henceforth we shall refer only to s . oating wall 0 is contained in one or the other of these pieces. It is obvious (we leave the combinatoric details to motivated readers) that the oating walls can be ordered, say from \left" to \right," in such a way that, for each , all the oating walls to the left of are contained in one of the two components of E s n and all the oating walls to the right of are contained in the other component.
Consider an extreme (say the leftmost) oating wall in this ordering, and let C be the closure of the component of E s n that does not contain any other oating walls.
Then C contains either one or two pure vertices. When C contains one pure vertex, it and the two endpoints of constitute a clique, hence one of them must be noncomplementary. If C contains two pure vertices, then Lemma 4.5 requires that one of the two is noncomplementary. Note that the two pure vertices are not in . The result is now clear. If there are two or more oating walls, then the two extremes of the ordering are distinct, the sets corresponding to C above are disjoint, and in each we can nd a noncomplementary vertex. When there is a single oating wall , the two analogues of C have as their intersection, but in addition to having a noncomplementary vertex in each analogue of C, we know that one analogue has two pure vertices, which cannot lie in , one of which is noncomplementary. 
We show, for each possible tuple~ that is consistent with Lemmas 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8, that the inequality (1) is impossible because N is su ciently large. We start with the next observation that follows immediately from Lemma 4.14: ( ) For two s 2 S, F s contains two noncomplementary vertices, and in order for these vertices to be shared by the two facets they must be either pure or high. Since we already had a low noncomplementary vertex, we deduce that N 3, again violating (4).
Case C:~ = (3; 1; 1; 1).
Again Lemma 4.6 implies that = 0, so (1) reduces to Lemma 4.10 implies that some low vertex is noncomplementary, so we need P s s 2 for (5). In addition, we know P s s 3 from Lemma 4.14. In case P s s = 2 or 3, Lemma 5.2 implies ( ) and we conclude that N 3, violating (5).
